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papers
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The Manifesto
Knobe, J. and Nichols, S. 2008.
An Experimental Philosophy Manifesto.
in Experimental Philosophy
J. Knobe and S. Nichols, eds. OUP.
Recent Papers
Arico, A. 2010.
Folk Psychology, Consciousness, and Context Effects.
Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 1(3): 371-393.
Arico, A., Fiala, B., Goldberg, R., and Nichols, S. 2011.
The Folk Psychology of Consciousness.
Mind & Language, 26(3): 327-352.
Arico, A. and Fallis, D. forthcoming.
Lies, Damned Lies, and Statistics: An Empirical Investigation of the Concept of Lying. Philosophical Psychology.
Cohen, J. and Nichols, S. 2010.
Colors, Color Relationalism, and The Deliverances of Introspection.
Analysis, 70(2): 218-228.
Fiala, B. and Nichols, S. 2009.
Confabulation, Confidence, and Introspection. commentary on Carruthers' "How we know our own minds",
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 32: 144-145.
Fiala, B., Arico, A., and Nichols, S. 2011.
On the psychological origins of dualism: Dual-process cognition and the explanatory gap.
in Mark Collard & Edward Slingerland (Eds.), Creating consilience:Integrating science and the humanities. OUP.
Frieman, C. and Nichols, S. 2011.
Is Desert in the Details? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. LXXXII No.1: 121-133.
Huebner, B., Bruno, M., and Sarkissian, H. 2010.
What Does the Nation of China Think About Phenomenal States?
Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 1(2):225-243.
Kozuch, B. and Nichols, S. 2011.
Awareness of Unawareness: Folk Psychology and Introspective Awareness.
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 18(11-12): 135-160.
Lopez, T., Zamzow, J., Gill, M. and Nichols, S. 2009.
Side Constraints and the Structure of Commonsense Ethics.
Philosophical Perspectives, 23(1): 305-319.
Nichols, S. 2011.
Experimental Philosophy and the Problem of Free Will.
Science, 331(6023): 1401-1403.
Nichols, S. and Bruno, M. 2010.
Intuitions about Personal Identity: An Experimental Study.
Philosophical Psychology, 23(3): 293-312.
Phelan, M., Arico, A., and Nichols, S. 2012.
Thinking Things and Feeling Things: On an (Alleged) Discontinuity in Folk Metaphysics of Mind.
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. Final version available here (subscription required).
Roskies, A. and Nichols, S. 2008.
Bringing Moral Responsibility Down to Earth. Journal of Philosophy, 105(7): 371-388.
Zamzow, J. and Nichols, S. 2009.
Variations in Ethical Intuitions.
Philosophical Issues, 19(1): 368-388.
More Papers (Broken Down According to Topic Area)
Consciousness and Mindreading
Free Will and Moral Responsibility
Intuitions
Moral Psychology
Other
Consciousness and Mindreading
Huebner, B., Bruno, M., and Sarkissian, H. 2010.
What Does the Nation of China Think About Phenomenal States? Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 1(2): 225-243.
Arico, A. 2010.
Folk Psychology, Consciousness, and Context Effects.
Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 1(3): 371-393.
Arico, A., Fiala, B., Goldberg, R., and Nichols, S. 2011.
The Folk Psychology of Consciousness.
Mind & Language, 26(3): 327-352.
Fiala, B. and Nichols, S., 2009.
Confabulation, Confidence, and Introspection. commentary on Carruthers' "How we know our own minds",
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 32: 144-145.
Fiala, B., Arico, A., and Nichols, S. 2011.
On the psychological origins of dualism: Dual-process cognition and the explanatory gap.
in Mark Collard & Edward Slingerland (Eds.), Creating consilience:Integrating science and the humanities. OUP.
Phelan, M., Arico, A., and Nichols, S. forthcoming.
Thinking Things and Feeling Things: On an (Alleged) Discontinuity in Folk Metaphysics of Mind.
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.
Free Will and Moral Responsibility
Roskies, A. and Nichols, S. 2008.
Bringing Moral Responsibility Down to Earth. Journal of Philosophy, 105(7): 371-388.
Nichols, S. and Knobe, J. 2007.
Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions. Nous, 41, 663-685.
Nichols, S. 2006.
Folk Intuitions about Free Will. Journal of Cognition and Culture, 6.
Nichols, S. 2004.
Folk Psychology of Free Will. Mind & Language, 19, 473-502.
Intuitions
Frieman, C. and Nichols, S. 2011.
Is Desert in the Details? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. LXXXII No.1: 121-133.
Nichols, S. and Ulatowski, J. 2007.
Intuitions and Individual Differences: The Knobe Effect Revisited.
Mind & Language, 22(4):346–365.
Machery, E., Mallon, R., Nichols, S., and Stich, S. 2004.
Semantics, Cross-Cultural Style. Cognition, 92, B1-B12.
Nichols, S. 2004.
Folk Concepts and Intuitions: From Philosophy to Cognitive Science.
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8(11): 514-518.
Nichols, S., Stich, S., and Weinberg, J. 2003.
Metaskepticism: Meditations in Ethno-Epistemology. In The Skeptics,
ed. S. Luper. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 227-247.
Weinberg, J., Nichols, S. and Stich, S. 2001.
Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions, Philosophical Topics, 29: 429-460.
Zamzow, J. and Nichols, S., 2009.
Variations in Ethical Intuitions.
Philosophical Issues, 19(1): 368-388.
Moral Psychology
Lopez, T., Zamzow, J., Gill, M. and Nichols, S. 2009.
Side Constraints and the Structure of Commonsense Ethics.
Philosophical Perspectives, 23(1): 305-319.
Nichols, S. and Mallon, R. 2006.
Moral Dilemmas and Moral Rules. Cognition, 100(3): 530–542.
Nichols, S. 2004.
After Objectivity: An Empirical Study of Moral Judgment.
Philosophical Psychology, 17, 5-28.
Nichols, S. and Folds-Bennett, T. 2003.
Are Children Moral Objectivists? Children's Judgments about Moral and
Response-Dependent Properties. Cognition, 90, B23-32.
Nichols, S. 2002.
How Psychopaths Threaten Moral Rationalism: Is It Irrational to Be Amoral?
The Monist, 85, 285-304.
Nichols, S. 2002.
Norms with Feeling: Towards a Psychological Account of Moral Judgment.
Cognition, 84, 221-236.
Other
Arico, A. and Fallis, D. 2012.
Lies, Damned Lies, and Statistics: An Empirical Investigation of the Concept of Lying.
Philosophical Psychology.
Cohen, J. and Nichols, S. 2010.
Colors, Color Relationalism, and The Deliverances of Introspection.
Analysis, 70 (2): 218-228.
Nichols, S. and Bruno, M. 2010.
Intuitions about Personal Identity: An Experimental Study.
Philosophical Psychology, 23 (3): 293-312.
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